By Dr. Ali Hassan Heydari
The Strait of Hormuz today is no longer just a strategic waterway; it has become the most critical test of American power in West Asia. And the significance of this test lies not in which side tells its victory story more loudly, but in a simpler question: has the United States — with all its military superiority — been able to restore Hormuz to its pre-war condition? The evidence now emerging from within the United States itself supplies a clear answer. It has not.
The Admission From Washington’s Own Think Tanks
The most authoritative American research centers have acknowledged that Iran emerged from the war with increased control and influence over the strait. According to the Brookings Institution, Iran managed to establish control over Hormuz in the aftermath of the war, gaining leverage over approximately one-fifth of the world’s oil — while America’s post-war position has deteriorated compared to its pre-war status. As Brookings wrote in June 2026, Iran has been able to use Hormuz as a lever of pressure by restricting shipping.
And Hormuz is not an ordinary maritime route. According to data from the US Energy Information Administration, approximately 20 million barrels of oil passed through the strait daily prior to the crisis. The same agency records how violently the disruption of the second quarter of 2026 shook the markets: Brent crude traded in a wild range, spiking to $118 per barrel at the peak of the crisis. Even now, in late August, prices remain far above pre-war levels, and — as Al Jazeera reported this month — hopes for a full reopening keep collapsing, because Tehran has made plain that the waterway will not return to “normal” without major American concessions. The issue, therefore, is not merely control over a strait. Every development at Hormuz translates directly into fuel prices, inflation, transportation costs, and the energy security of the global economy — including that of the United States.
A Blockade Is Not a Restoration
From here, Washington’s current deadlock becomes apparent. The US can insist on continued military pressure and blockade. But the ability to sustain a blockade is not the same as the ability to restore global trade to normalcy. The longer this situation persists, the more its cost will be borne not only by Iran: the global economy, Arab oil-producing countries, Asian consumers, and even the American people will pay the price through rising energy costs and inflation.
Under such conditions, discussions about “transit fees” or financial mechanisms to guarantee shipping security are no longer peripheral issues. They are part of the effort to find a practical way out of this strategic deadlock. The very talk of controlled transit and coordination fees — reportedly around $2 million per vessel under recent arrangements, which Iran insists are fees for coordinating safe passage rather than tolls — is the sound of the equation shifting. To discuss them at all necessarily requires accepting the design of new arrangements for Hormuz, and that acceptance itself signals a change in the balance.
Equally, the United States must abandon a comforting illusion: that pipelines and alternative routes can reduce global trade’s vulnerability to Hormuz. The geographical and economic reality remains unchanged. None of these alternatives can fully replace Hormuz in the short term. For this reason, the only viable strategy is not the elimination of Hormuz, but the acceptance of new arrangements for it.
Firepower Cannot Restore Confidence
The central question for Washington is therefore no longer whether the US possesses sufficient military power to pressure Iran. It is whether Washington can guarantee stable, normal shipping security without a political agreement with Tehran. The experience of recent months has shown that the answer is far from simple.
This reveals a fundamental truth: military power can destroy military positions, but it cannot alone restore a vital waterway to normalcy. Shipping security depends not only on the presence of warships. Shipping companies, insurers, tanker owners, and energy markets must all have confidence that passage through the strait is safe and predictable. More important than any political claim of “control” over the strait is the restoration of normal commercial flow — and that confidence cannot be bombed into existence.
No Sustainable Order Without Iran
Thus the question today presents Washington with a simple choice, however bitter: either continue efforts to return Hormuz to its pre-war status — which is no longer achievable — or accept the escalating military, economic, and political costs within the framework of an agreement that aligns shipping security with the region’s new reality. In the end, the United States will likely find itself compelled to choose the second option.
At the same time, one principle cannot be ignored: no sustainable and workable arrangements for Hormuz can be established without considering Iran’s role. This is precisely the reality that American sources — albeit in different language — have approached and acknowledged. The experience of Hormuz has demonstrated that while the United States possesses enormous destructive power, restoring the normal flow of trade through such a vital chokepoint requires more than firepower. It requires acceptance of the failure of the war strategy against Iran, acknowledgment of realities on the ground, and the pursuit of a comprehensive, guaranteed agreement for an honourable exit from the current strategic deadlock.
If Washington insists on denying the new reality through continued military pressure, it will eventually be compelled — in the long term — to accept withdrawal from the region. Conversely, accepting a new security and economic framework, even if politically difficult for the United States, could provide a path to reduce costs and end the current stalemate.
Because in the Strait of Hormuz today, geography is intertwined with the global economy. And given Iran’s strategic military capabilities, no power can ignore the reality that Iran is now stronger than it was before the war.