TEHRAN — In a striking revelation that dismantles Western media narratives, Iran’s Tasnim News Agency has presented compelling technical evidence pointing to the Israeli regime’s complicity in the recent cyberattack on French cold storage facilities. The report decisively refutes Paris’s baseless accusations attempting to implicate the Islamic Republic of Iran.
On October 11 and 12, hackers remotely manipulated temperature settings on refrigeration systems across approximately 700 French retail locations. The sabotage resulted in tens of millions of euros in spoiled food and triggered at least 15 fires. In the aftermath, French officials hastily and without credible proof accused the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of orchestrating the disruption.
However, a detailed investigation by cybersecurity specialists, cited by Tasnim, exposes severe flaws in this narrative. The attack primarily targeted AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355 control units manufactured by the Danish company Danfoss. According to data from the cyber infrastructure monitoring platform Censys, France hosted 61% of the world’s StoreView central refrigeration control panels prior to the incident.
Crucially, most of these systems ran outdated software versions that allowed administrator passwords to be calculated using the current date. This direct exposure of industrial control interfaces to the public internet meant they were vulnerable to basic scanning tools, requiring neither advanced hacking capabilities nor state-level resources. Tasnim emphasised that these conditions indicate automated scanning and the widespread exploitation of unpatched equipment, rather than a sophisticated, targeted state operation by Iran.
The Israeli Connection
The most damning evidence lies in the public domain. Tasnim highlighted three known vulnerabilities affecting the targeted Danfoss devices, including authentication bypass and remote code execution flaws. While Danfoss issued security patches in March and August 2025, the exploitation method was already well-known within specific circles.
Notably, the Israeli cybersecurity company Claroty had previously demonstrated at the Black Hat conference exactly how these authentication bypass and remote code execution flaws could be combined to compromise the devices.
“This attack method had long been available to any hacker, thanks to the Israeli security company,” the Tasnim report stated, presenting Claroty’s prior knowledge of the exploitation chain as a strong indicator of the Zionist entity’s involvement in the attack.
Questions of Complicity and False Flags
Given the well-documented, close security and intelligence cooperation between France and the Israeli regime, Tasnim raised a critical question: Why did Claroty not inform French cybersecurity authorities, such as CERT-FR and ANSSI, of the technical details of this vulnerability and its active exploitation chain before the incident occurred?
This glaring omission suggests the incident may have been leveraged as part of a coordinated media and psychological campaign to direct blame toward Tehran, shielding the actual perpetrators while attempting to tarnish the Resistance Axis.
The Iranian Foreign Ministry has firmly rejected the allegations as “entirely unfounded,” categorically denying any involvement. This latest exposure serves as a stark reminder of the Zionist regime’s ongoing reliance on deception, cyber warfare, and false-flag operations to isolate the Islamic Republic and its allies.
Reference: Al-Mayadeen


